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Stephen R. Bowers

Information Warfare
The Computer Revolution Is Altering How Future
Wars Will Be Conducted

F

or more than a decade, the information revolu-

tion , spurred o n b y the deve lopment of advanced
computer techno logy, has had a dramati c impact.
o n every aspect of our Uves. Commercial activities,
all the way fro m the w o rld 's rmanc ial marke ts to rhe
m ost basic purchases in stores , arc drivt:: n by the
co m)'mcr revoluti o n. It is, therefore. nOl surpri sing
that military operations are equaUy bound by these
te<..: hno logies w hich , at first g lance, seelll so remote
from the wo rld of troop movemen ts and co mbat.
But, in fact, these technologies are changing not on ly
society but also our definition of war and the conduc t of military o perations.

A consideratio n of some fundamental elements of
military affairs-command, com ra l, an d co nununicatio ns- reveaJs the in evitability of this deve lopmenr.
Each o f these elements is enhanced by the advent of
new co mputer technologies and, at the same time ,
mad e more vuln erable by our de pendence o n them .
The role of <..:omp uter te<..:imology has had such a dramatic impact o n military operations that the traditi o nal designation of cOIl1ffiand, control , and comillUnic:ltions - C3 -has been c han ged to C4 by the ade\i(ion of <..:UlI lput t:rs.
The technological vulnerabilities of modern sociery- both its commercial and its military co mpone lHs-are w idely recognized . In the military realm ,
an y techno logy that e nhances o pe ration s can be
L1sed by an adversary to destroy the ability to perform
an y of the fun c tions essential to survival.
Info rmation warfare (J\V) is the term most often used
to describe the exploitation of these vulnerabilities.
This concept has both o ld and new usage, a fact that
contributes to some misunderstanding toda y. In its
e lflicr applications, it included psycho logical operatio ns, electronic warfare , and othe r militar)' innovations. It has also encompassed the notion of "informario n dominance" over an enemy-the ability to
more q uickly and more complere1)' understand battlefield develo pments. However, in spite of some
confus ion ove r termin o logy, it is possible to identify
points of agreement about the impact of o ur technological vuln erJ.bilities, what constitures info rmation
warfare, and how I\V can affect o ur national sec urity.
ll1ere is a clea r consenSus regarding the dramati c
increase in the vulne rability of modern soc iety. l eaders of modern societies recogni ze t hat powe r grids ,
transportation networks, finan cial systems, and telephone eXChanges are exposed to the threat posed by
the almost invisible computer assaila nts who can
touch so man y aspects of our lives.
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NETWORK VULNERABILITY
Mode rn warfare , unlike that of pa st epochs, is "information intensive ," meaning the conduct of effective
military o p erations requires a greater accumulation
of data than ever before. Today, access to information is just as crucial as possession of p etro le um, oil ,
lubricants , and anununitioll.
Studies of allied operations during the GuLf \Var offer
dramatic proof o f the degre e to which this development has produ ced a revolution in military stra tegy.
According to a recent analYSiS, there arc hundreds of
thousands of "auacks against military information
systcms each year and , while almost aU of thcse penetratio n efforts have been by so-called "hac ke rs ," and
although nearly ;IU have fail e d, the t"cw thar have
been successful raise troubling prospects. Possession of one valid 10 and password leads to the exposure of o ther, presumabl)' better-protected, sires. A
breakdown in ne twork security at any po int may
facilitate access into th e entire system.
n

A co mputer system ·s vulnerability is compounded b)'
(he fa ct that attacks against it are likely to be staged
from a remQ(e po in t. Through manipulation of a
telephone syste m and skillful use of a computer, a
distant and unse en aWlc ke r can cause incalculable
damage "vith little likelihood of being identified. In
1996, for example, an unkn o wn hac ker succeeded in
sh utting down the entire web site fo r the Environmental Protectio n Agency.

EVOLVING CONCEPT
Th e technological revolutio n that created op portunities for IW has also sown co nfusi o n among the
mili tary services. The inability to agree 011 a precise
detinilio n re nects diffic ulty in g rasping the fu ll implicatio ns of their vu lnerability. Consequently, there is
uncertainty abollt what should be considered T\V elements, targets, and objectives .
At its inceptio n, there was agreement that information warfare essentially played a tactical role . I\Velements such as psychological operati o ns (pSYOP),
tactic al deception , and e lectronic warfare were often
desig ned to give military units a shorHeml ad,,-anmge- one suffiCient to prevail during a single
engagement. The tools of the trade included dences
designed to inhibit enemy radio communicatio os.
thereby disrupting troop movements on the barnefidd. In this technologically unsop histicated era_
both the mission and the techniques of f\~ were relativel), si mple and direct.
The begi.nnings of a modification 1O this e:lrl y f\V
concept can be traced to lhe field of busi.n ess studies, "vhere scho lars and practitio ne rs viewed infornla-
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tion warfare as a device designed for the commercial
environment. In the business world , f\V was
described as a process for gaining and maintaining an
advantage over competitors or adversaries. This simple idea has a direct relevance to military operations
in which competitive relationships are matters of life
and death. Viewed within the military contex t, information warfare encompasses activities designed to
undermine essential infonnation networks u pon
which nations rely for performance o f governm ental,
military, or commercial ope rations.
\Vith the incorporation of new technologies , the military now includes the physical destnlction of C4
assets within its I\'(/ definitio n . This could be accomplished either by co nventional means or through the
use of the electromagnetic pulse ( E'\1P) generated by
nuclear explosions. EMP, of course, can destroy
radios and c ompute rs for m iles around an explosio n
site. But even when high-value national infraStnlCture assets became possible targets of l\'{I strikes, T\Xi
relained a primarily tactical role-one geared to disrupting enemy communications within an area of
operations.

METHODS VS. OBJECTIVES
One common defmition of I\'{I refers to it as any malicious ac t done with computer technology, a phrase
which, while true, lacks the precision required for a
more comprehensive definition. Yet it does serve a
usehll purpose by attempting to focus on the methods of IW rarher than its Obje ctives.
Recent experience indicates that what may bewithin the confines of the most general of definitions- considered information warfare is often more
properly regarded as trivial har.l.ssment. In an effort
to distinguish mere nuisances from activity that
poses a serious threat, computer specialists have
estabtished three categories for classifying various
levels of threats to computer security.

• Category One covers personal attacks , such as the
common practice of flooding a person 's mailbox
with unwanted Internet messages by placing his
name on thousands of electronic mailing lists. The
irritating result is that the victim loses use of his electronic maiJ service and is required to take the time to
remove his addre ss from the mailing lists.

• Category Two involves industrial attacks against
businesses by their "enemies. " Tobacco companies
are frequ ent victims of this type of attack. lndustrial
attacks have the potential of disrupting major co rporate operations and could re sult in devastating economic impacts.

• Category Three involves national attacks- efforts
directed against institutions responsible for essential
national services. Defense agencies and financial
structures are among (he most prominent targets of
this IW category.
In a contemporary environment in which computer
technologies are employed in support of milit<lI1'
activities, 1\\1 has been expanded to e ncompass
strategic objectives. A recent US military e xercise
was based on a scenario in which the outcome of a
major war in the JVliddle East hinged on the disruption of power grids , telephone networks, and transpOl-ration systems by an invisible adversal1' who
attacked from cyberspace. Categories Two and

to a strategic le vel , possibly determining not only the
outcome of a particular battle but also (he fate of
natio ns at war.
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The evolution of warfighti.ng capabilitieS demonsfla tes a central theme: the struggle of nations to
project their power more effectively and more
aftordably than pott:ntial adversaries. In evaluating
n ational po wer, attention is ahvays given to what
m ay be described as symheric sources of powe r.
The t\VO eleme nts most often cited are military prep aredness and industrial capacity. Modern computer
s),stems are re levant in each of these areas , anel rw
has a direct impact on their p e tiornlance.

University,
Harrisonburg, VA.

\'(lith I\X/, {he w eapon is not gunpowder or expensi'"e bo mbers b ut rather the ability to ge t and lise
infornlatio n. and [() alter it in such a w ay as to disrupt the enemy's capabilities. IW offers thc ability to
destroy the coherence of an enemy force by distorting the sensor inpms required for its operation.
Psycho logical operations are a significant area for
introducing T\Xl , especially dis information. Covert
operations are another. Repo rtedly, one of the techniques emplo yed by the CentrdllnteUigence Agency
in combati.ng terro rism in"olved disrupting international financial acth-ities of supporters of suspected
te rrorists ,-ia co mputer intervention .
Also , informatio n warfare (by othe r names) has been
an inlpo rtant pan of tbe US mission in Bosnia. Personnel from US PSYOP units h ave bee n stationed
there since the Dayton agreement was sign ed,
One of the most signifieam co nsequences of recent
change s in computerized military activit ies is that the
c onventional dic ho tomy bern-een civilian and military realms has been d inlil1.ished. Advances in
defense technology have re quired t he mil itary [Q rely
upon civilian contractors [Q develop, operate, and
maintain information systems ancl their related components. TIle specialized demands of this work have
precluded many unifonned pe rsonnel wi rh their
more general skilllevtls from p e rformi ng these
highly specialized services. Conscquemly, o n an
individual basis, civilian persolUlei oftcn ass ume
greater military significance than their unifo rmed
counterparts.
As the distinction between unifoffilcd and civilian
p e rsonnel diminishe s, the installation and operation
of information systems that serve as force multipliers
will enable smaller g roups of people to work with
deadly consequences in combat situations. Equally
significant in an era in which [he line berween war
and peace is incrca singly blurred , rw groups can be
e mployed effectively in both situations.

I

A declaration of war or the advent of open and violent hostilitie s is no longer a prerequisite for deploying (or employing) military forc es. This fl exibility in
the use of force is consistcnt with the long-term
effOl-r to synchronize the real and psychological
effects of various, complementary national force
capabilities. In future c riscs, the va rio us com ponentS
of national force , including I\V capab ilities, will be
e mployed as a single weapon . As a result , the conduct of future warfare will be qualitati\'ely diffe rent
from that of the post-World \Var II era . •
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